|
COCHABAMBA'S WATER REBELLION -- AND BEYOND
Sunday, February 11, 2001
by Lewis Dolinsky, San Francisco Chronicle
Protesters celebrated in Cochabamba, Bolivia, last April after
the government rescinded a contract with a private consortium
to run the city's water system.
Known for its artisan and farmers markets and
the nearby coca fields, Cochabamba (population 500,000) is Bolivia's
third-largest city. A successful insurrection there was one of
last year's underreported stories:
An estimated 40 percent of the population had
no piped water or sewage services. The municipal water company
was in disarray. It was privatized. An international consortium
took over, raised prices precipitously and was thrown out by the
people, who blockaded the city for days. Before the federal government
gave up in April and canceled a 30-year concession, troops were
sent in, bullets and tear gas were fired, and a young man was
killed.
This saga has a Bay Area connection. The private
water company, Aguas del Tunari, which had 20 percent Bolivian
ownership, was a creation of International Waters Ltd. IWL is
a partnership between an Italian company, Edison SpA, and the
giant Bechtel Corp. of San Francisco.
If Bechtel, or its offshoot, can go to Cochabamba,
then Marcela Olivera of Cochabamba can fly to San Francisco, get
her first view of the ocean ("it is very large") and
tell her side of this controversy. Olivera assists her brother
Oscar, a labor leader who is a spokesman for the Coordinating
Committee for the Defense of Water and Life, usually referred
to as La Coordinadora. This umbrella group of workers, peasants,
environmentalists and human rights advocates took over the water
system when the consortium was forced out.
Marcela Olivera says her brother is in danger:
"The government has taken many actions against many people
since April - raided houses, wiretapped phones. Death threats,
most recently in October. Harassment is continual." The evidence
is clear, she says, that the Bolivian investors in Aguas del Tunari
have high connections in government. And are not good losers.
Olivera is concerned about what will happen,
in weeks or months, after the Bolivian government settles its
legal case with International Waters. She expects an attempt to
take back the water. First, men with suits will come, saying:
This just isn't working. Only if necessary, she says, men will
come with guns.
For most in Cochabamba, this struggle is about
money, not theory: When the water system was privatized, Bolivians
making $100 a month were suddenly paying $20 of it for water.
Some bills are said to have risen 200 percent, even 400 percent.
Bechtel disputes such figures, saying rates typically rose 35
percent. That's still a lot.
Bechtel acknowledges that the contract set a
"goal" (not a guarantee) of a 16 percent return on investment
for Aguas del Tunari. The company was also locked into building
large projects, including a dam that even the World Bank says
is ill-advised. Aguas del Tunari had inherited $35 million in
debt from the municipal utility and was expected to start paying
it off.
The corporate version is that the private company
started making improvements and raised prices as needed but structured
increases to hit the big users. After February's protests, it
rolled back prices and made refunds. Then in April, it was out.
Not a happy experience.
A fact sheet from International Waters insists
that opposition came not primarily from ordinary people but from
the affluent or those who had a vested interest in the old "informal
water market." IWL is sick of people saying that it bought
the water system; it signed a legitimate contract to provide a
service. It just happened to be the only bidder. And yes, Bechtel
and IWL are in business to make money. Under terms of a bilateral
agreement between Bolivia and the Netherlands, where IWL is incorporated,
IWL is entitled to out- of-pocket expenses plus unrealized profits
projected over the life of the deal.
Negotiations between International Waters and
Bolivia are amicable, according to Michael Curtin, executive consultant
to IWL, and "We expect to get our money." He will not
say how much. Bolivia has shallow pockets. If a settlement is
ever made public, the government of Hugo Banzer may have to admit
that it paid a multinational corporation big money to do nothing.
Curtin doubts the government will try to retake
the water system from La Coordinadora. He says four Bolivian regimes
have failed to resolve Cochabamba's water problem; this one may
say, "It's all yours." Olivera's fears may be exaggerated.
Down in Cochabamba, Jim Shultz, a San Franciscan,
has plagued Bechtel with accusations and reports in his Center
for Democracy e-mails. Shultz's ally Tom Kruse says the government
might leave Cochabamba water in the control of La Coordinadora
if this were not part of a larger struggle. At the urging of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the Bolivian national
airlines, oil and gas, telephone, rail lines - all have been sold
off, or are being sold off, and often to foreign investors. Olivera
was shepherded around the Bay Area by Antonia Juhasz of the International
Forum on Globalization. Juhasz is warning in public meetings against
a possible privatization of San Francisco water and takeover by
Bechtel.
These are competing international conspiracies:
Globalization and anti- globalization, privatization and the resistance
to it. But what about Cochabamba's water? How does it taste? Is
it getting to more people?
Olivera says, "The water is sweet"
now that it is controlled by the people, and there are new hookups
in the hills where the poorer poor live. Kruse says that service
may be slightly better but that this is still a struggling enterprise.
Curtin says he hears of some pipe connections in the hills but
does not know about sewage service. When asked for a prognosis,
Curtin mentions that a prominent economist among the group that
took over the water system was educated in Moscow and taught in
Havana. So he is not very good?
Curtin says: No, he's fine. He has as
good a chance as anybody of solving this problem.
|